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Highlights
•First study focusing on theorizing the absence of conflict and its causes.
•A systematic analysis of Latin American projects illuminates why conflicts escalate.
•Provides a novel typology to differentiate the role of grievances in conflicts.
•Local political-cultural dynamics explain conflict better than other factors.
•Conflict existence depends on the quality of industry-activist-state actor relations.
Abstract
In November 2013, Suzano Papel e Celulose, a Brazilian paper company, is projected to inaugurate the world's
largest pulp mill in Imperatriz in the remote state of Maranhão, Eastern Amazon. This investment will further
consolidate Brazil's position as the leading exporter of wood-pulp coming from vast, corporate-controlled
industrial plantations. These inland forestry investments are a feature of the second wave of large pulp
projects, extending inland from the best lands in the coastal belt via accessible rivers and railroad networks.
This globally significant inland expansion has been poorly studied, if at all. No publications exist on this Suzano
pulp project. Empirically, this article provides a baseline study on the political economic dynamics.
The case is highly relevant for conflict theory. Generally, industrial tree plantation expansion has boosted
grievances, but the resistance and conflicts have varied depending on the social actors' agency. In comparison
to the high-intensity conflicts between the rural social movements such as the Brazilian Landless Movement
(MST) and the pulp companies in most other new investments, there has been a rare absence of conflict in this
case, as no movement has seized on local grievances. Conflicts cannot be studied in-depth by focusing only on
conflict cases. Absence-cases open up an opportunity to revisit the question why conflicts arise. An analysis of
this case allows an empirically rooted theoretical discussion on conflict causalities, which can answer several
vexing questions in the study of conflicts. A new and generally applicable typology of different types of
grievances is offered, and the grievances' causal relation to conflicts is examined. The importance of political
dynamics and inter-personal relations in investment conflicts is emphasized. The way culture influences conflict
dynamics is pondered upon by ethnography of the Brazilian conflict culture, where personal relations are more
relevant in explaining conflict escalation than in the political systems with a stronger (impersonal) rule of law.
The role of third parties such as other industries in the investment area is discussed. A qualitative comparative
analysis of the major pulp project conflicts and their causes in Latin America is offered. Mobilization and thus
conflict causality is explainable only when taking into account the types of grievances and the local, inter-
personal, and organizational (state–business–movement) relations by which these are remediated and
negotiated.
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1.1. Conflicts over pulpwood plantation lands and conflict causalities
The increased demand for commodities including timber has caused growing socio-environmental pressure
across the globe (Borras et al., 2011). An illustrative example of this dynamic is the march of new large-scale
pulp projects deeper into Latin America (e.g. Brazilian inlands, Uruguayan pampas, and Chilean cordilleras). As
a consequence of pulp expansion, traditional rural and ecological mosaics have been converted into sources of
transnational, single commodity extraction. In many Latin American pulp projects, community activists have
seized on local grievances fuelled by already incurred or expected socio-environmental damages, creating
conflicts (Kröger, 2011, Kröger, 2012 and Kröger, in press). Yet this has not happened everywhere.
Endowments, the investment area's geographic position or grievances are not sufficient conditions to explain
conflict, as there are numerous cases across the world, also in global peripheries, with extreme damage levels
and high grievances that do not have conflicts (such as the one studied here). 1 To make causal claims on what
creates conflicts requires the study of social relations in particular political–cultural contexts, including
comparisons to non-conflict cases. The striking absence of conflict in Suzano's new pulp investment in Brazil's
Western Maranhão offers a possibility for re-examining the reasons for the variance in conflicts (or their
absence). To look deep into conflict, one must look even deeper into non-conflict situations.
The article is of considerable interest in the context of increasing contestations and conflicts in various parts of
the world between local communities, corporate actors and the state over the control and management of
natural resources (White et al., 2012). The general reasons for state/industry–local community conflicts have
been widely discussed, particularly within political economy and ecology (Peluso and Watts, 2001, Martínez-
Alier, 2002 and Peet et al., 2010). However, conflict absence has not been studied. A Scopus search (5 February
2013) for publications mentioning “absence of conflict” with “land” or “forest” found no results; a search for
“absence of conflict” and “resource” resulted in six articles, none of which engaged in studying the dilemma of
conflict absence.
Previous studies on tree plantation conflicts have mapped the correlations between grievances and conflict
(e.g. Gerber, 2010), but much more study in needed on the causal chain leading to mobilization and conflict
escalation.2 The causal chain from grievance to protest is not automatic, but embedded in socio-political
relations. These must be pruned to be able to show causality. This argument, developed in the article, can add
more depth to the explanation of all kinds of conflicts.
Research material was collected through fieldwork in Latin America between 2004 and 2011 in most of the new
pulp investment areas (see Kröger, 2011, Kröger, 2012 and Kröger, in press for details about data and
methods). Ethnography and participant observation in the Eastern Amazon regarding the new Suzano project
was conducted in early 2011, with 35 semi-structured interviews of key actors in Portuguese (ranging in length
from 1 h to long sessions on several days, average length 2.5 h), including representatives of local communities,
movements, intellectuals, state actors, and company directors.3 A case study approach was adopted, using the
snowball sampling method and triangulation.4 A systematic qualitative comparative analysis (see Ragin,
1987 and Kröger, 2011 for methodological discussion) of this case data to that collected on other pulp conflicts
in Latin America (in Kröger, 2011, Kröger, 2012, Kröger, in press, Kröger and Nylund, 2012 and Nylund and
Kröger, 2012) guided the theory foundation and analysis.
1.2. Objective
Understanding the ever-more urgent phenomenon of industrial forestry conflicts (or their absence) requires
analysis of the political processes whereby land use is determined. Earlier research has shown that local
investment-level dynamics have to be pruned in order to understand how outcomes are defined: global or
national-levels, where the initial decisions are made, do not determine the subsequent trajectory ( Hall, 2002,
Kröger, 2011 and Kröger, in press).
The surprising absence of conflict related to eucalyptus plantation expansion, exposed while interviewing
Suzano stakeholders one by one, suggested that what was theoretically interesting in this case was to study 1)
why there were no major conflicts, and 2) how they had thus far been avoided. All possible alternative
explanations had to be assessed. This included the analysis of grievances, cultural context, and the dynamics
around previous land-use projects in the socio-political context where the investment was located. To explain
the role of particular actors and their doings in relation to others required analyzing if there was active agency
on the part of some individual to prevent conflicts from arising, agency with substantial capacity to influence
these dynamics.
I will first discuss the causal relationships between grievances and mobilization, and then the role of
movement–state–industry dynamics in conflicts. Next, a regional development history sheds light on the
different kinds of grievances Big Pulp in Imperatriz region has boosted, and which not. The role of inter-
personal relations and the cultural context are then analyzed to explain more in-depth the surprisingly non-
conflictive character of the project's agrarian relations. The concluding sections summarize the findings.
1.3. Theory
1.3.1. Forestry conflicts, agency, culture and power relations
What is a conflict? It is useful to distinguish conflicts by their intensity, both for methodological and conflict
resolution purposes. A recent large study attempting to compare global mining conflicts for example divides
these into three levels: low-level conflicts (some local organizing); medium (street protests or other visible
mobilization); high (deaths, violence, or arrests) (Özkaynak et al., 2012). This categorization is adapted here.
Earlier forest policy research has illustrated conflicts can be visible or invisible (Hubo and Krott, 2013--this
issue). The visibility depends on the recognition and communication of an issue as a conflict, not on the
“objective” situation itself (Hubo and Krott, 2012). Practically anything can be defined as a conflict. In this
sense, conflicts exist everywhere all the time, power struggles being omnipresent. If an actor group wishes to
and manages to transform an issue into a contentious one, conflict becomes visible. Thus, conflict studies are
studies about the use (and non-use) of resistance strategies that shape the policy agenda and process ( Kröger,
in press).5 A central question arises: why do actor groups decide not to communicate a situation as a conflict?
Culture and political economic relations play key roles.
Hellström (2001) has approached forestry conflicts by seeing them as cultural products of a given country. The
presupposition taken in this ‘conflict culture’-approach is that every culture has a tendency to produce
particular types of conflicts, and an inclination to react into these in a particular manner (Hellström, 2001). The
notion is helpful in examining the role of local culture in conflict causalities. DaMatta (1992: 139), a renowned
anthropologist of Brazil, has argued that in Brazil ‘there is a long road to travel between the existence of a crisis
and its recognition.’ Conflicts are typically not seen as productive feedback, by which to correct policy, but as
‘omens of the end of the world, as signs of unbearable failure,’ this cultural valuation curbing conflict
recognition. So cultural variations in conflict dynamics have to be taken into account.
Power relations within the political economy also influence conflicts. Particularly those defending the dominant
economic interests do not typically want conflict visibility: investors and the general public might become wary
of the ethical issues and negative impacts. Markets typically react to conflicts strongly, taking these as a sign of
uncertainty and risk: large-N studies in the United States have found that protests against a company generally
cause a fall in stock value (Soule, 2009). State actors, on the other hand, are afraid of conflicts shaming their
ability and legitimacy to work for public good. However, why do negatively impacted social actors not mobilize
always, attempting to make a conflict visible? Several explanations have been given to address this dilemma.
1.3.2. Grievances in pulpwood plantation projects
Grievances have been argued to play a role in social movement mobilization (McAdam et al., 2001). To be able
to test the role of grievances, it is best to disaggregate them to different types. This is done below for the
pulpwood plantation expansion, the dissaggregation being applicable to other sectors. First, there is a set of
‘specific grievances’ typically arising against corporate pulpwood plantations: pollution of soil and waters in the
investment area; expansion to traditional communities' lands; rural mechanization and ensuing
unemployment; industrial pollution; increased traffic due to logistical operations; outsourcing and the
degradation of working conditions; creation of food insecurity by monocultures and land concentration in
areas of intense rural exodus, lacking agrarian reform, public policies, and without titling of traditional
territories (Carrere, 2009 and Gerber, 2010). A universally applied investment model, such as the large-scale
pulp model, tends to create a set of broadly similar industry-specific grievances across different contexts.
Second, there are ‘relative grievances,’ which set the specific grievances in a contextual and historical setting.
Local people judge new projects based on past experiences, evaluating methods of insertion and potential
benefits and losses in land use change based on what is considered a just way of distributing land access in the
local ‘moral economy’ (see Wolford, 2010). Third, there are also the more ‘objectively observable grievances’
such as state capacity and the ecological suitability of a region to receive a massive investment: if the
investment surpasses the objective limits, grievances are likely to arise. Maranhão's state infrastructure for
receiving a massive investment, with massive impacts of the size of the Suzano pulp project, is arguably the
least developed in the context of Brazilian pulp expansion: it is the poorest state, with least capacities to take
care of potential problems such as rural exodus (Nascimento and Morais, 2009 and Puppim de Oliveira, 2008).
Grievances are typically framed by activists. Using pre-existing categorizations to address complex local
problems related to abrupt changes, framings never completely describe the phenomena in play (Snow and
Benford, 1992), but allow politicization via a discursively transmissible conceptualization of eucalyptus, for
example, as ‘producing hunger’ (Kröger, 2011). Another issue is how framing/grievances lead to mobilization.
1.3.3. Grievances do not explain mobilization
The movement literature offers various explanations for mobilization (McAdam et al., 2001 and Wolford,
2010). For example, the ‘political opportunity structure’ theorists, still powerful in social movement studies,
argue that the leeway in the political system to mount a movement is the most important explainer of
mobilization (e.g. Tarrow, 2011). This strand argues that the building of enduring movements, and the
attainment of goals via conflicts, is easier in liberal political systems where mobilizations receive media
attention and are not repressed. In another theoretical vein, the Marxist treatments of mobilization normally
emphasize that movements arise in consequence of economic hardship, where actors have objective
grievances that are too much to bear (as examples, see Polanyi, 2001 and Silver, 2003). In the Marxist sense,
Big Pulp would be the driving agrarian change phenomenon, an objective grievance, and ensuing conflicts
merely the (almost) unavoidable symptoms of this economic process. Still others emphasize the role of agency,
framing and ideology (Snow and Benford, 1992). In general, there is variation within different theoretical
schools between those seeing mobilization as dialectically and almost automatically following the accumulation
of grievances (when people just cannot stand injustice anymore), and those emphasizing agency and internal
movement organizations (McAdam et al., 2001 and Tarrow, 2011).
A systematic comparison of conflicts (and their absence) in all the major pulp investments in Latin America
suggests that grievances, political opportunities or framings alone or in conjunction do not automatically or
even mostly explain mobilization (Kröger, in press). What was more important was to engage in multiple state-
remediated political games using both contentious and routine political strategies, all of which turned passive
people into active contesters and demanders of citizen rights. Political games through which investment
politics are remediated can be divided into two main categories: state-remediated and private politics ( Soule,
2009 and Kröger, in press). Private politics includes corporate social responsibility (CSR) and other direct
stakeholder dialog attempts that seek investment governance by companies without government intervention.
The role of private and state-remediated politics in the Suzano investment will be discussed, and compared to
other cases, to decree whether CSR and other forms of private politics may decrease mobilization and conflicts.
2. Background
2.1. Historical explanations: development and grievances on the pioneer frontier
The state of Maranhão, and the Eastern Amazon in general, have a history of predatory logging, violence, and
continuing social injustice (May, 1990 and Puppim de Oliveira, 2008), such as debt slavery. This region has been
subjected to large-scale investment projects of resource exploitation of national and global importance since
the 1970s, principally via the huge Projeto Grande Carajás (PGC) (Santos, 2011). PGC, a key project of the
military regime, inserted the Eastern Amazon, socio-culturally, environmentally, and economically, into the
circles of national and global capitalism (Nascimento and Morais, 2009). Huge mines, infrastructure, metal
industries, charcoal furnaces, logging operations, pasturelands, industrial forestry, and other developmentalist
projects were implanted (Franklin, 2008: 186). Former forestlands including virgin forests and agroforestry
smallholdings, most of which were state lands, were turned into inefficiently managed pastures, now claimed
by descendants of large-scale land-grabbers (Asselin, 2009). Peasant populations that were expelled or bought
out have increasingly contested land use and ownership rights since the 1980s (Puppim de Oliveira, 2008).
Rural conflicts are ubiquitous, the number of families displaced in these (13,701 families in 2010) being clearly
the highest of all the nine Brazilian states that have large pulpwood plantations (Kröger, 2012: 958). This brew
of messy land rights, rising mobilization, and compounded injustices has generated an investment context that
can easily become combustible. Yet, the land prices are among the lowest in Brazil: in 2006, the average
pastureland price in Maranhão was 184 reais, by far the lowest across all nine pulpwood expansion states
(ibid), offering a strong incentive to invest. Eucalyptus, soybean and other plantation expansion has been
rampant in the past five years, often characterized by high-intensity conflicts.
2.2. The better of two evils: from charcoal to pulpwood eucalyptus
Eucalyptus and pine plantations were established in the Amazon beginning in the early 1970s by the Médici
government, to implant pulp mills in the future, but in the mid-1980s these plantations were turned over to
charcoal production (Santos, 2011). Smoky charcoal furnaces in the region regularly use debt slavery to force
workers into subhuman working conditions, resulting in severe damage to health and deprivation of basic
human rights (interviews with public prosecutor Felicio Pontes, Belém, 1 March 2011; Milton Teixeira from the
Center for Defense of Life and Human Rights (CDVDH), and Padre Antonio from the Combonian
Missionaries/Justice on the Rails, Açailândia, 17 March 2011). In this setting of negatively perceived charcoal
dominance, the population of the Imperatriz region greeted the news of a pulp investment by Celmar SA
Industría de Celulose e Papel in 1992 as a chance to develop an alternative to the charcoal industry (interviews
with local movement leaders, March 2011).
Nevertheless, rural movements (including trade unions and landless movements) resisted Celmar, fearing
corporate land concentration and environmental havoc. Celmar, which initially bought about 30,000 ha of
lands in the region, with extensive accompanying rural exodus, never finished a pulp project, but in 2003
turned into a charcoal operation called Ferro Gusa Carajás (Santos, 2011: 190). This created great
disappointment in the general local population, which felt betrayed as they had believed they would receive
jobs and development, not more charcoal-production related pollution and problems. Celmar bought all types
of territories and used ‘the most varied forms of pressure’ to create extensive continuous eucalyptus
plantations, without being obliged by environmental authorities to obtain the legally required licenses
(Franklin, 2008: 192).
Enter Suzano. Vale, a Brazilian iron-ore company which owned most of Celmar, started the final downsizing of
all its (nominally) pulp and paper sector shares in 2001 (Franklin, 2008: 193), continuing to operate the Ferro
Gusa Carajás plantations (about 34,000 ha), and using them for its charcoal furnaces. Now Vale has sold also
these plantations to Suzano, while also selling eucalyptus to Suzano from its plantations in the Pará state.
Besides this, according to a company director, Suzano acquired about 50,000 ha of native forests from Vale's
ex-Celmar project (interview with Adriana Carvalho, responsible director of Suzano's Northern environmental
and social impacts, Imperatriz, 18 March 2011).
After the Celmar episode, which the local population reported seeing as a deceitful and deliberate way to sell a
charcoal project to the region, using pulp investment as a Trojan horse while nevertheless bringing in the
undesired eucalyptus plantations, Suzano's arrival was greeted with suspicion by all. Despite a call to arms
against Suzano's Maranhão and Piauí projects by Latin American anti-eucalyptus monoculture activists ( Barros,
2008 and Carrere, 2009), however, the resistance in Imperatriz region did not visibly mobilize against or
influence the environmental impact assessment that concluded in licensing pulp mill construction in November
2010 (see SEMA, 2010). Mill construction started in early 2011.6 The other eucalyptus expansion projects,
focusing on energywood in Maranhão and pulp in Piauí, were strongly resisted by rural movements, and
discontinued.
This was not the way it had to go in Imperatriz: proactive state actors, landless movement activists and their
allies in the Southern Rio Grande do Sul state resisted the implantation of three massive pulp ventures in 2005–
2008 and managed to discontinue these projects (Kröger, 2011). That resistance was highly organized to visibly
protest and bar the conversion of potential land reform areas into eucalyptus plantations. In Maranhão, by
contrast, quite a few activists saw the turning of existing eucalyptus plantations from charcoal into pulp
production as a relative improvement, even if they criticized the structural change in land access. There had
been no visible pulp plantation-conflicts as of February 2013.7
The absence of rural conflict is odd, considering the high objective and investment-specific grievances. For
Adalberto Franklin (Interview, Imperatriz, March 2011), a local intellectual and publisher, Suzano was causing
‘massive rural exodus’ which he has seen is ‘filling the city's slums,’ and the company was also ‘occupying and
claiming ownership on communally or customarily held lands of squatters that would have a right to these
lands by law via their existing use of the land for production.’ Several land ownership lawsuits have already
entered the justice system, public prosecutors helping the displaced people.
3. How conflicts have been avoided thus far: stakeholder views on Suzano impacts
3.1. State–industry relations
At Incra (the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform) in Imperatriz, the directors were quite
concerned about Suzano. José Duarte, Incra's agronomist in the region since the 1970s (interview, 14 March
2011), said Suzano had “bought the most fertile and best situated land areas all around, which could have been
given over for food production.” He suggested that “the government should earmark areas for the production
of food” and that “zoning must be done” to make the expansion sounder. Incra officials lamented they do not
have the resources of corporations to buy land for the landless. For the superintendent, José Redondo
(Interview 16 March 2011) the land problem is serious, “as no one is interested in selling lands to Incra” and
because Incra is weak in impacting the local land use policy (which is steered much more by the rural
movements in Redondo's view). According to the superintendent, Suzano is taking over large land areas.
In another central institution with lawful possibilities to steer land investment pace and style, the federal
environmental office Ibama (the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources; which
the regional socio-environmental director of Suzano, Adriana Carvalho, headed before joining the company),
and its current director Orlan Ascenção (interview, Imperatriz, 16 March 2011), said that eucalyptus planting
for charcoal and pulp is ‘reforestation,’ in line with Suzano framing. Ascenção also said that ‘we are not paying
much attention to the environmental impacts [of Suzano], as these are explained in their Environmental Impact
Assessment [done by Pöyry, a Finnish consulting company, prior to the investment, based on company
estimates, and approved by executive powers largely favoring investment].’
Opinions of politicians varied, most being pro-Suzano. Carlos Brandão (no date), a federal parliamentarian of
the PSDB party, who was involved in both pulp projects (Celmar and Suzano) together with his party-fellow
Sebastião Madeira, the mayor of Imperatriz, praised the project, saying such development should be
‘celebrated and embraced.’ Even though the project came ‘late,’ it was ‘finally here!’ The vice-mayor of
Açailândia, Antonio Erismar (PT), is worried about the investment: ‘traditional areas of rice and beans, food
plantations, have today been taken over by eucalyptus’ (Dantas, 2011). In most local accounts, the state
government was framed as having been in the clutches of the conservative family of José Sarney (PMDB) for
over 40 years, and strongly embedded in corporate agency. The current governor, Sarney's daughter, has
strongly supported the investment.
When asked if the government or state were listening to their grievances, Eli Kerobina from the rural trade
union STTR said that ‘the Sarney family governing Maranhão gives everything to the pulp companies, licensing
included. When a Sarney was not elected governor (2005–2008), and the PDT party not favorable to pulp
projects came into power, then [eucalyptus] expansion stopped, but after the Sarney family returned, the
expansion started again.’8
The public prosecutors have filed suits, as the company has not acquired the legally required plantation
permits from the environmental authorities. Meanwhile, the expansion has continued, the company arguing
that the licensing by state-level executive powers it has received is sufficient. These accounts reveal that the
state institutions are weak (non-autonomous and lacking bureaucratic capacity) and rule of law absent or low,
while the executive political power is strong.
3.2. Rural trade unions: ‘What leaves us frustrated is that they get all the land’
Local extractive populations' associations, socio-environmental NGOs, and Rural Trade Unions (STTRs) resisted
the implementation of Celmar's pulp mill, and had a significant role in impeding the Celmar project according
to some movement leaders (Santos, 2011: 195), even though internal corporate factors (leading to charcoal,
not pulp) were more important for some leaders. Why did these not resist Suzano? The answers varied by
movements. In contrast to other Brazilian pulp conflicts, the most antagonistic views in interviews were given
not by the landless movements, but the landed trade union peasants.
According to Eli Kerobina, a high-ranking member of the rural trade union in Imperatriz, ‘all impacts of Suzano
have been negative’ (Interview, 16 March 2011). To a question on the positive impacts of Suzano and strategies
the trade union has used to influence the situation, Kerobina replied that ‘Suzano, as Celmar before, offers
many social programs, but in reality just wants to take over land’; the government has not listened to peasant
grievances. Yet Kerobina also said they are able to sit at the table with Suzano to present and discuss project
proposals:
If they would offer projects to family agriculture things could be different. We have many proposals. But what
leaves us frustrated is that they get all the land. Of course many want to offer their lands to Suzano, even from
our association. Normally those who sell are large-scale farmers. We have not yet managed to slow down the
expansion of Suzano. We have not occupied eucalyptus plantations as they have many guards and we would
need machines [to cut eucalyptus]. But we have a campaign, and would like the company to cease from
existing, or to do things differently, without expelling us, but returning the land to the state and farmers.
The existence of a campaign but the lack of any visible protest suggests that the Suzano relations with rural
unions were in a low-level conflict, which could nevertheless be remediated by direct dialog in the view of the
unionist. All the other rural movements (MST, traditional extractivist populations, indigenous, afro-Brazilian
communities, and others) were in an absence of conflict with Suzano.
State absence and direct negotiation suggests that Suzano–rural trade union relations were characterized by
private politics, and possibly also by fear and lack of serious protesting capacity. Similar private politics were
present also in the MST–Suzano relations: this is very interesting as the MST has a much stronger protesting
capacity than any other movement in Brazil and Maranhão (Kröger, 2011).
3.3. MST relations: ‘Suzano was different, but we know it is not different’
José Luis da Silva Costa, from the MST (Interview, coordinator of the California settlement, Açailândia, 13
March 2011), had a friendlier attitude towards Suzano. MST had attained large settlements for their landless
members in the region in the past, which might partly explain the difference with trade union-linked farmers
feeling the pressure of eucalyptus advance on their irregularly or conventionally registered small plots.
However, there are also other reasons. José Luis lives and is active in a 7000 ha agrarian reform settlement of
15 years containing 183 families next to the charcoal plant and eucalyptus plantations of Vale that Suzano
bought. Since March 2010, Suzano has been visiting the settlement, ‘attempting to win people to its side, to co-
opt them, offering courses, jobs, a library, equipment.’ Relations are cordial and even friendly. For José Luis,
Suzano wants to be the friend of the settlement in the middle of their eucalyptus lands, and can even help in
‘getting government money and using it for our benefit.’ Importantly, ‘they promised that the charcoal
furnaces would be closed after this cycle of eucalyptus. For Vale, our presence did not matter much when they
installed the furnaces in 2004 next to us. They did not communicate with us. Suzano was different, but we
know it is not different. They gave us instructions on how and equipment to put out fires in the eucalyptus
woods, and assured us we would not have the health problems we had with Vale's use of herbicides next to
us.’
In the MST discourse, the discussion of Suzano as ‘different’ illustrates a primarily private politics-type relation.
‘But we know it is not different,’ on the other hand, illustrates how deep differences in interests and
ideological–political objectives are not necessarily translated into conflicts.
The absence of conflict escalation can be explained by a variety of factors. First, there was a shared interest
between the potential protester (MST) and its target (Suzano), and a significant third party (Vale). The role of
third parties has often been neglected in conflict and movement studies, yet should be carefully studied as it
often plays a very important role in explaining outcomes (Luders, 2010). Since routine legal/political means
used against Vale had not brought results, the MST settlers started regular protests against the pollution
caused by the furnaces. Divina Lopes (several interviews, Açailândia, March 2011), the leader of MST in
Maranhão, discussed the struggles in detail. After Celmar turned to charcoal, MST thought that Celmar and
Vale had betrayed the population. This is why the MST started a series of anti-Vale occupation protests, the
first in the April of 2004. On 8 March 2008, about 500 women forcibly entered Vale's charcoal furnace area
next to the California settlement, attempting to destroy machinery and cause economic losses, cutting
eucalyptus, and blocking the federal highway running in front. Vale's sale of the charcoal eucalyptus plantation
to Suzano was a win–win situation for all these parties, including the important settlement, even though the
preferred land use policy of the movement would be family agriculture. Suzano got the plantations and earned
MST-trust. Vale got several profitable business deals with Suzano and got rid of a conflict. Suzano's promise to
shut down the polluting charcoal furnaces pleased the MST California settlement. It resolved a deep grievance
they had had.
Furthermore, the anti-charcoal acts demonstrated the disruptive potential of the MST in the area. The message
of such protest acts showing movement strength in general is that the movement is to be taken seriously ( Tilly,
1994). Such history of protesting against Vale, a company that is far more powerful than Suzano, suggests that
also the Suzano project could had been discontinued if efforts were made.9 In this sense, it was wise for Suzano
to approach MST ‘differently,’ particularly considering that in its eucalyptus-monoculture reliance it was not
‘different’ in the ideological and structural, land access-sense for the movements. However, the MST also felt
that it had not been ‘betrayed’ in the same way by Suzano as by Vale, this emotional stance potentially
impacting the lack of protesting more than the calculation of capabilities.
3.4. Suzano's rural CSR policy in Imperatriz
Another conflict delimiting factor was good inter-personal relations. Suzano's Adriana Carvalho (Interview,
Imperatriz, 18 March 2011), argued the company acts differently, by ‘establishing good practices with
communities. … California [MST settlement] is an example of this.’ Suzano's ‘different’ rural CSR practices help
to explain the absence of rural conflict: in comparison to other pulp projects, there was no conflict, and much
more dialog in Imperatriz. Contextually, Suzano's approach was different in Imperatriz than in the Extreme
South of Bahia, where Suzano has a big pulp mill in Mucuri. Interviews with the Bahian MST leaders (Porto
Seguro, 1–15 April 2011) revealed that of the three pulp companies operating in the area (Veracel, Fibria and
Suzano), Suzano had given the least to the movements, and was the most antagonistic in the movement's eyes.
This highlights that project and region-based differences are more significant than company-specific lines.
Management guidelines are applied in a variety of ways in different contexts, and the personal trajectories
imbued in the local social life of the executing company personnel matter a great deal. This shows how, in the
end, conflicts come down to personal relations (or the lack thereof). Carvalho, the director of socio-
environmental issues at the Suzano Maranhão/Piauí projects, was considered by environmental authorities,
movements and state actors linked to the Workers' Party (PT) in the Imperatriz region as someone who comes
from their ranks. This required at least accepting her calls for dialog, and surely influenced the creation of a
friendly, even cautionary, tone in company–movement–state institution negotiations.
It is important to note that the delimiting factors overlap and are thus greater than their sum. An analysis of
local conflict culture can illustrate how the dynamics between grievances, interests, emotions, capacities and
inter-personal relations influence conflict escalation.
4. Explaining the difference: inter-personal relations and local conflict culture
Why no conflict? Firstly, the land use change that the key activists experienced differed from other similar
investments, as a significant parcel of the eucalyptus stands were transferred from the existing and highly
problematic charcoal industry to the pulp industry, besides the typical conversion of pasture, agricultural and
forestland to eucalyptus monocultures (which also occurred). Buijs and Lawrence (2013--this issue) argue
changes in land use trigger emotions, which influence information processing and mobilization of protest. In
this view, as land use change experienced by the key movement activists was mixed, it could be argued that
the causal chain was not ignited.
Yet, in fact, land use change does not automatically trigger emotions. The existing established relations
between social actors guide the arising of emotions. The cultural context influences the emotional exchanges.
In Brazil, inter-personal relations are much more important than formal rules and relations (DaMatta, 1992).
The locally established (now) Suzano director–local activist friendship explains partly why members of the MST,
in deep conflicts with all pulp companies, also with Suzano in Bahia and São Paulo, were not inimical in
Imperatriz. To start a conflict here would involve much more difficult emotional transformation than there
where existing friendship does not delimit the range of allowed emotions towards a person. To start a conflict
would ruin the existing personal relations, inseparable from politics.
Or is the absence of conflict explainable by the project phase? People have been found to dramatically change
their opinion on Brazilian pulp projects after two years of operation, when the construction period jobs
disappear and the real socio-ecological impacts start to reveal themselves (Kröger, 2012 and Kröger, in press).
However, elsewhere the MST has protested strongly also in situations where the locals have been largely in
favor of the pulp project still under construction (e.g. Veracel protest in April 2004) (Kröger, 2011).
5. Results
Table 1 below summarizes the findings of the qualitative comparative analysis on the conflicts and their
explanatory factors in eucalyptus plantation expansion in all the Big Pulp investments in Latin America on
which ethnographic or interview data was collected (specific references to data sources can be found in Kröger,
in press).10 In addition, the energywood plantation projects in Maranhão by Vale and Suzano are included.
Table 1.







































Suzano (MA) Absence Yes Mixed Private No Yes
Aracruz (ES) High No Negative State Yes Yes
Stora Enso
(RS)
High No Negative State Yes Yes
Aracruz (RS) High No Negative State Yes Yes
Fibria (BA) High No Negative State Yes Yes
Veracel (BA) High No Negative State Yes Yes
Suzano (BA) High No Negative State Yes Yes








































CMPC (Peru) Medium No Negative State Yes Yes
CMPC (Chile) High No Negative State Yes Yes
Arauco
(Chile)
High No Negative State Yes Yes
Botnia/UPM
(Uruguay)




Suzano (MA) High No Negative State Yes Yes
Vale (MA) High No Negative State Yes Yes
The table reveals most conflicts have been high-intensity. The Suzano Maranhão pulp project is the only one
with absence of plantation-based conflict. Three projects had medium-level conflicts. Botnia (in Fray Bentos)
had only low-level conflicts in Uruguay where the investment was located, but widespread protesting across
the border river with Argentina, where people considered the land use change wholly negative, not mixed as in
Uruguay. In Peru, the resistance forced by early protests the parliament to stop CMPC's project in the Amazon
in 2008 before it could start. In Rio de Janeiro state, the 2002 Aracruz expansion was stopped by protests and
subsequent state-laws. Arrests, violence or deaths were not involved in these cases, but in the others, yes. In
no case have the rural populations considered the land use change positive; the case studied here and Botnia
were the only ones where relative grievances were mixed. The case at hand differs from all the others also in
the sense that the politics between the company and the local movements has not been thus far primarily
state-remediated, but relied mostly on direct negotiation, private politics. In all the other cases, the resistance
has pressured primarily the state to delimit the negative impacts. Significant objective and industrial forestry-
specific grievances existed in all the cases, this suggesting they were not as important as the other factors
observed.
The quality of inter-personal company–movement leader relations, relative grievances, politics (private or
state-remediated) and other industries practices in the investment area explain the difference between conflict
existence and absence. Conflict-intensity was lower if the expansion was stopped early, before even truly
starting (Aracruz in Rio de Janeiro, CMPC in Peru). The Botnia case is an outlier, as it has been an international
conflict between Uruguay and Argentina, which has created altogether different dynamics than conflicts within
the jurisdiction of one political system. These results apply across industry-lines, as the same causalities were
found also in the (wood) energy sector cases studied. However, future studies should integrate also conflict
and non-conflict industrial forestry and other industry cases from all other parts of the world to assess the role
of the particular conflict culture in Latin America in the causalities presented in Table 1.
6. Conclusions
This research is valuable for general theory-making on when and how land use-based conflicts arise, and when
not. The findings are generally very relevant in at least five ways. First, for better or worse, inter-personal
friendship between key activists and investment managers tends to create a barrier to conflict escalation. This
applies particularly in political and conflict cultures where personal and professional lives have not been
separated into a universal rule of law (e.g. Brazil, but also in most other non-Western contexts, DaMatta,
1992). Second, this applies particularly if the land use change impacts of the investment are not wholly
negative, but perceived to be partially positive by and for the key activists.
Third, in weak-state contexts such as Maranhão, corporate agency matters more in explaining conflict
existence than in strong state contexts, where the state–movement interaction carries relatively more
explanatory power. There was active agency on the part of key Suzano personnel to prevent conflicts from
arising, agency with substantial capacity to influence the dynamics in a private politics-setting. Corporate social
responsibility comes down to the local interpersonal relations of key managers.
Fourth, the role of third parties has to be also studied, as activists calculate what is the most urgent target of
mobilization, and as third parties' clout can be used by both activists and targets to steer investment
negotiations. Particularly the presence of companies, whose targeting offers larger publicity for movements,
and those framed as creating greater grievances, should be studied.
Fifth, the types of grievances in the investment area should be studied and divided into sub-categories
(investment model-specific; relative; and objective). The land-use trajectory in the investment region matters,
as grievances are not only objective or specific but also relative. The locals in Western Maranhão pinpointed
that Big Pulp was relatively less harmful than charcoal; the absence of relative grievances/framings in the
conversion of charcoal eucalyptus plantations into pulp production helped to ‘consume’ the resistance
potential of specific grievances/framings related to pulp. Significant specific and objective grievances, related
to rural exodus and filling of slums, for example, existed, yet conflict had not occurred. This implies that
relative grievances about negatively perceived land use change are more important than specific or objective
ones. Grievances do not automatically explain conflict. The local political–cultural dynamics explain conflict
better than the project stage, grievances, geographic location or other explanations.
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Footnotes:
1
For example, Özkaynak et al. (2012) study on mining conflicts across the world illustrates that although a rough
correlation between e.g. water resource damage and conflict exists, similar grievances exist in both low and
high-level conflicts, leaving conflict-cause as a puzzle. Gritten et al. (2013--this issue) argue by a quantitative
analysis of conflict representation in the internet in English that conflicts would be located mostly in global
resource peripheries. This does not reveal conflict causes and does not correspond to actual conflict spread,
which should be verified by actual studies. A qualitative comparative analysis based on in-depth field research
on actual conflicts and local politics, provided here, can open up the causalities and test the claims of
correlation-studies relying on secondary data.
2
Conflicts have been found to correlate foremost with corporate land enclosure leading to displacement (e.g.
Gerber, 2010) and environmental transformations caused to locals by investments (e.g. Hall, 2002). The case at
hand shows that even in the presence of these grievances, agrarian conflict does not necessarily occur or
escalate.
3
A social movement consists of ‘a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under
the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers,
commitment, unity, and worthiness’ (Tilly, 1994: 7).
4
Although a thorough study was done, carefully selecting a representative mix of key actors, it is possible the
information retrieved is limited in some aspects; also, most interviews were with movement or institutional
leaders, not ordinary people. Some of those interviewed may also have been careful with their wordings, as
they knew the results would possibly be published and read by Suzano and others, with whom they had real
stakes at play.
5
This research agenda, adopted here, approaches conflicts non-normatively, not attempting to resolve them or
making value judgments on their impacts. The more common approach in conflict studies is to recognize
conflicts so as to resolve them (Glasl, 1999 and Druckman, 2005). In forestry, conflict resolution and
management are seen as serving the goal of supporting public interests by making policies more balanced,
taking into consideration differing interests such as conservation and economic use of forests (e.g. Hubo and
Krott, 2012).
6
Suzano ordered the pulp machinery from the Finnish Metso, which has produced 75% of the world's pulp valve
capacity (www.metso.com).
7
The workers constructing the mill have organized several large-scale protests and roadblocks to demand
salaries to be paid and better renumeration. The inhabitants along the Estrada de Arroz road leading to the mill
site, whose condition has worsened significantly due to the heavy-weight traffic, have organized and protested
visibly (see https://www.facebook.com/FDCEstradadoArroz?ref=ts&fref=ts, 5 February 2013). The MST,
however, has not been involved in these Suzano-related conflicts, but continued direct protests against Vale,
blocking the duplication works of the Iron Railroad, to demand Vale to pay the recompensation to locals it
promised (http://www.mst.org.br/node/12866, 5 February 2013). The railroad is extremely important, carrying
the ore from Carajás and future pulp of Suzano to the coast. The railroad, allowing four days faster transport to
Europe than by the Southeastern Brazil's coastal pulp ventures, is an important economic explanator for the
investment.
8
The centrality of governor change in stopping eucalyptus expansion temporarily suggests that in weak-state
context electoral politics can be a more efficient arena to influence investment style than institutional politics.
9
In fact, the other major project of Suzano in Maranhão, expanding 2-year rotation eucalyptus for energywood
(pellet) in the Northeastern part of the state, as well as the pulp mill project in Palmeirais in the neighboring
state of Piauí, were discontinued by court orders in 2012 after concerted movement-progressive state actor
resistance (http://territorioslivresdobaixoparnaiba.blogspot.fi/2012/07/o-lugar-da-sustentabilidade-nos.html).
10
Fibria/IP and Eldorado investments in Mato Grosso do Sul, Cenibra in Minas Gerais, and some older
investments in São Paulo were not included as I did not have primary data for them. Also the Stora
Enso/Arauco project, Montes del Plata, in Uruguay, was left out for this reason. Otherwise, the table is
comprehensive. Aracruz is now part of Fibria, 'Aracruz' referring to pre-2009 conflicts in the table.
